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Is it a Violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act to 
Require a Spouse to Guarantee a Loan?  If Not, it 
Should be. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Access to credit is an integral part of our economic structure.1  
Credit, which has not always been simple to obtain, is necessary for most 
people to purchase a home or invest in a business.2  In the past, women 
seeking out loans were frequently rejected from obtaining credit despite 
being otherwise creditworthy candidates.3  Often this was due to 
discriminatory lending practices.4  In an effort to counteract the 
discriminatory practices involved in credit lending, Congress enacted the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) in 1974.5  The ECOA protects 
creditworthy borrowers from being denied credit based on a number of 
characteristics that have no bearing on their ability to repay a loan.6  One 
 
 1. See Todd Zywicki, “Consumer Credit and the American Economy,” Part I:  
Consumer Demand for Credit, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2014), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/10/13/consumer-credit-and-
the-american-economy-part-i-consumer-demand-for-credit/?utm_term=.510c93cab79c 
(“Evidence shows that three-fifths to two-thirds of families have such credit outstanding at 
any one time in recent decades and that most consumers use consumer credit at least sometime 
during their financial lifetime.”).  
 2. Id. 
 3. See Allen Abraham, Credit Discrimination Based on Gender:  The Need to Expand 
the Rights of a Spousal Guarantor Under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 10 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 473, 478 (2016) (“‘[D]ivorced, separated or widowed wom[en were] 
considered a bad credit risk because [they were] without male support, financial or 
otherwise.”). 
 4. See id. (quoting Comment, Credit Equality Comes to Women:  An Analysis of the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 960, 965 nn.28–29 (1976)) (“Some 
creditors went as far as requiring women to sign an affidavit ‘swearing not to endanger their 
ability to repay their debts by having children.’”). 
 5. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 502, 88 Stat. 1521, 1521 
(1974) (codified 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2016)) (“It is the purpose of this Act to require that 
financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of credit make that credit 
equally available to all creditworthy customers without regard to sex or marital status.”). 
 6. Id.; see Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Amends Rules to Provide Flexibility 
and Clarity to Certain Mortgage Lenders in Collecting Information, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-
amends-rules-provide-flexibility-and-clarity-certain-mortgage-lenders-collecting-
information/ (“The Equal Credit Opportunity Act is a federal civil rights law that protects 
against discrimination in the financial marketplace.  Regulation B, the CFPB’s rule 
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such characteristic is marital status, in addition to race, color, religion, 
national origin, sex, age, receipt of public assistance income, and the 
good faith exercise of any rights under the Consumer Credit Protection 
Act.7 
Although the ECOA was enacted to eliminate unfair lending 
practices, credit lending discrimination still occurs.  Hawkins v. 
Community Bank of Raymore brought an oft-considered issue to the 
Supreme Court of the United States:  whether it is a violation of the 
ECOA to require a spouse to guarantee a loan.8  This issue has been 
litigated in a number of different jurisdictions, with no clear-cut answer 
rendered.9  While courts were hopeful Hawkins would bring closure to 
the debate, an eight-member Supreme Court demonstrated how judicial 
philosophies are split on this issue through an equally divided per curiam 
decision.10  Until the Supreme Court creates binding precedent on all 
circuits, creditors, borrowers, and lower courts are left in the dark as to 
what they should do when it comes to a spouse guaranteeing a loan.11   
 
implementing ECOA, includes restrictions regarding lenders’ ability to ask consumers about 
their race, color, religion, national origin or sex, except in certain circumstances.”). 
 7. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. 93-495, § 502, 88 Stat. 1521, 1521 (1974) 
(codified 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2016)) (“The Congress finds that there is a need to insure that the 
various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extensions of credit exercise their 
responsibility to make credit available with fairness, impartiality, and without discrimination 
on the basis of sex or marital status.”). 
 8. See generally Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1072 (2016). 
 9. See Hawkins, 136 S. Ct. at 1072 (rendering an equally divided Supreme Court per 
curiam); RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Group, LLC, 754 F.3d 380, 
385 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding the ECOA definition to be ambiguous and instead relying on the 
Regulation B definition and ultimately ruling spousal guarantors are considered applicants); 
Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atlantic Mkt. Dev. Co., 476 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding 
wives are not considered applicants and therefore spouses cannot use the ECOA as protection 
when they are guarantors). 
 10. See Hawkins, 136 S. Ct. at 1072 (illustrating how challenging this matter is since the 
Supreme Court could not find a definitive answer to the question of whether or not a spousal 
guarantor could be considered an applicant under the ECOA); Evan Weinberger, High Court 
Splits On Whether Loan Guarantors Are Applicants, LAW360 (Oct. 5, 2015), https://w 
ww.law360.com/articles/707802/high-court-splits-on-whether-loan-guarantors-are-
applicants (“As the high court heard arguments in the Hawkins v.  Community Bank of 
Raymore case over loans for a failed real estate development, a rift opened between the court’s 
conservative bloc, led by Justice Antonin Scalia, and liberal wing over whether the Fed had 
the authority to specifically state in 1985 that spousal guarantors could bring a discrimination 
claim even though that right was not specifically provided in the ECOA.”). 
 11. See Kathryn Reed Edge, Bank on it:  Circuit Split on Definition of “Applicant” 50 
TENN. B.J. 28, 29 (2014) (“Until this issue is resolved by the United States Supreme Court, if 
ever, bankers in the 8th Circuit will wonder whether they should listen to the judiciary or 
Federal Reserve examiners who frequent their banks.”). 
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If a nine-member Supreme Court heard this issue and interpreted 
the language of the ECOA by using a Chevron analysis, the legal 
determination would likely be the same as it was in the Eighth Circuit’s 
decision in Hawkins, holding that spousal guarantors are not protected by 
the ECOA.12  Due to this likely outcome, Congress should amend the 
ECOA to include protection for spousal guarantors.13 
This Note proceeds in six parts.  Part II explains the history and 
background of the ECOA as well as Regulation B.14  Part III analyzes the 
decision in Hawkins v. Community Bank of Raymore.15  Part IV examines 
holdings in different circuits and what it means to be an “applicant” under 
both the ECOA’s statutory language and according to Regulation B.16  
Part V discusses the potential impact of adopting each definition of 
“applicant.”17  Part VI presents recommendations to avoid future 
confusion about spousal guarantors.18  
II. THE PURPOSE OF THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT AND 
REGULATION B 
Before the ECOA put safeguards in place, women had difficulty 
obtaining credit.19  It was not only a challenge for single or divorced 
women, but also for married women.20  Often, married women would be 
denied credit unless their husbands guaranteed their debts.21  Creditors 
frequently succumbed to outdated and unsubstantiated beliefs and would 
 
 12. See Hawkins, 136 S. Ct. at 1072; see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (explaining if there is no ambiguity in the statutory 
language, then the Court is to follow the definition within the statute). 
 13. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.7(d)(5) (2017) (“The applicant’s spouse may serve as an additional 
party [supporting the application], but the creditor shall not require that the spouse be the 
additional party.”); RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 383 (“[A] portion of Regulation B . . . 
refer[red] to as the ‘spousal-guarantor rule,’ which prohibits a creditor from requiring an 
applicant’s spouse to guarantee a credit instrument, even if the creditor requires someone to 
execute a guaranty.”). 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See infra Part IV. 
 17. See infra Part V. 
 18. See infra Part VI. 
 19. Abraham, supra note 3, at 477–78. 
 20. Abraham, supra note 3. 
 21. See Abraham, supra note 3 (quoting Comment, Credit Equality Comes to Women:  
An Analysis of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 960, 965 nn.28–29 
(1976)) (“Some creditors went as far as requiring women to sign an affidavit ‘swearing not to 
endanger their ability to reap their best by having children.’”). 
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deny a woman credit based on the idea that “she would be [too] distracted 
by child care or some other stereotypically female responsibility,” and 
therefore would be too much of a credit risk.22  The ECOA was enacted 
in response to lenders requiring spousal guarantees, and set out to “make 
credit available with fairness, impartiality, and without discrimination on 
the basis of sex or marital status.”23  Therefore, Congress made it 
“unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant . . . on 
the basis of . . . sex or marital status” regarding any aspect of a credit 
transaction.24   
When the ECOA was first enacted, the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve (“Board”) was responsible for its implementation.25  
However, after the 2008 financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”) 
transferred the authority of overseeing the ECOA to the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”).26  Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the 
CFPB was granted rule-making authority within its jurisdiction, and was 
also given authority to supervise and enforce compliance with the ECOA 
and its implementing regulations.27  In keeping with the intended purpose 
of the ECOA, the CFPB adopted Regulation B, which makes it unlawful 
for a creditor to refuse credit to an otherwise creditworthy applicant on 
the basis of sex, marital status, or any other prohibited basis.28 
 
 22. Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atlantic Mkt. Dev. Co., 476 F.3d 436, 441 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(“[I]t is apparent that what the Act was intended to do was to forbid a creditor to deny credit 
to a woman on the basis of a belief that she would not be a good credit risk because she would 
be distracted by child care or some other stereotypically female responsibility.”). 
 23. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-435, § 502, 88 Stat. 1521, 1521 (1974) 
(codified 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2016)). 
 24. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a). 
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 1691b(a).  
 26. 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b) (2016); 15 U.S.C. § 1639b(c)(3)(C) (2016) (“[T]he [CFPB] shall 
prescribe regulations to prohibit . . . abusive or unfair lending practices that promote 
disparities among consumers of equal credit worthiness but of different race, ethnicity, 
gender, or age”); RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Group, LLC, 754 
F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Congress mandated that the agency charged with overseeing 
ECOA—first the Federal Reserve, now the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau—
promulgate regulations ‘to carry out the [statute’s] purposes.’”). 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 1639b(c)(3)(C); Valerie L. Hletko & Caroline M. Stapleton, Deference 
in Decline:  ECOA’s Regulation B and Agency Discretion Might Not Be Broad Enough to 
Include Spousal Guarantors, 104 BANKING REP. (BNA) NO. 3 (Jan. 20, 2015) (“The CFPB 
inherited the Board’s implementing regulations, including Regulation B, and accompanying 
administrative interpretations.”). 
 28. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.1(b) (2017) (“The purpose . . . is to promote the availability of credit 
to all creditworthy applicants without regard to race, color, religion, national origin, sex, 
marital status, or age.”). 
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Spousal guarantors are treated differently depending on whether 
the court chooses to adopt the ECOA or Regulation B definition.  The 
major discrepancy between the two arises from one word:  applicant.29  
An “applicant,” as defined in the ECOA, is “any person who applies to a 
creditor directly for an extension, renewal, or continuation of credit, or 
applies to a creditor indirectly by use of an existing credit plan for an 
amount exceeding a previously established credit limit.”30  While this 
appears to be a straightforward definition, the ECOA’s definition of 
“applicant” differs slightly from that of Regulation B.31   
Prior to 1985, guarantors were excluded from Regulation B’s 
definition of applicant.32  However, the Board broadened Regulation B’s 
scope after learning credit discrimination was still occurring and having 
an impact on individuals guaranteeing loans.33  Regulation B now defines 
“applicant” as “any person who requests or has received an extension of 
credit from a creditor, and includes any person who is or may become 
contractually liable regarding an extension of credit.  For purposes of 
[section] 1002.7(d), the term includes guarantors, sureties, endorsers, and 
similar parties.”34   
These differing definitions raise the issue of whether a 
“guarantor” can be considered an “applicant.”35  The simple answer is 
that under the ECOA, maybe; under Regulation B, yes.36   
 
 29. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b) (2016), with 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(e) (2017). 
 30. 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b). 
 31. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b), with 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(e). 
 32. Revision of the Board’s Equal Credit Regulation:  An Overview, 71 FED. RES. BULL. 
12, 913, 918 (Dec. 1985) (defining “applicant” as “any person who requests or who has 
received an extension of credit from a creditor, and includes any person who is or may be 
contractually liable regarding an extension of credit other than a guarantor, surety, endorser, 
or similar party”). 
 33. Id. (“After weighing the various considerations, the Board revised the definition of 
applicant to include guarantors. It based the action on the premise that although its primary 
concern may have been to protect the individual seeking credit, the Congress had a broader 
purpose in enacting the ECOA:  to bar discrimination on the basis of marital status in any 
aspect of a credit transaction.”); Hletko & Stapleton, supra note 27 (citing Revision of the 
Board’s Equal Credit Regulation:  An Overview, 71 FED. RES. BULL. 12, 913, 918 (Dec. 
1985)) (“The Board reasoned that a person required to ‘assume a debt obligation’ as a 
guarantor due to marriage ‘has suffered discrimination based on marital status’ within the 
meaning of ECOA.”). 
 34. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(e) (amending Regulation B’s definition of “applicant” to include 
“guarantors”). 
 35. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b), with 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(e). 
 36. 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b); 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(e). 
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The issue of whether or not a guarantor is an applicant has 
become a problem in the realm of spouses guaranteeing loans, commonly 
referred to as spousal guarantors.37  When the Board promulgated 
Regulation B, it included the spousal guarantor rule.38  The spousal 
guarantor rule prohibits creditors from requiring that a spouse guarantee 
the other spouse’s debt, even if a guarantor is necessary for a creditor to 
extend the line of credit.39  While it is lawful for a spouse to guarantee a 
loan, under Regulation B it is unlawful for a creditor to require the spouse 
to be a guarantor.40  Under the spousal guarantor rule, if a spouse was 
forced into guaranteeing a loan, the spouse would be able to raise an 
ECOA violation as an affirmative defense to the creditor’s action in the 
event of a default, and the entire debt may be voided and therefore 
uncollectable.41  However, the ECOA definition includes no such 
provision.42  The discrepancy between the competing definitions in 
ECOA and Regulation B was brought to bear in Hawkins.43 
 
 37. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.7(d)(5) (2017) (“The applicant’s spouse may serve as an additional 
party [supporting the application], but the creditor shall not require that the spouse be the 
additional party.”); RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Group, LLC, 754 
F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[A] portion of Regulation B . . . refer[red] to as the ‘spousal-
guarantor rule,’ which prohibits a creditor from requiring an applicant’s spouse to guarantee 
a credit instrument, even if the creditor requires someone to execute a guaranty.”). 
 38. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.7(d)(5). 
 39. Id. (“The applicant’s spouse may serve as an additional party [supporting the 
application], but the creditor shall not require that the spouse be the additional party.”). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See Bolduc v. Beal Bank, SSB, 167 F.3d 667, 672 (1st Cir. 1999) (allowing ECOA 
violations to be raised as an affirmative defense of recoupment); Silverman v. Eastrich 
Multiple Investor Fund, L.P., 51 F.3d 28, 32–33 (3d Cir. 1995) (permitting defendants to use 
violations of the ECOA as an affirmative defense for recoupment); Bank of the West v. Kline, 
782 N.W.2d 453, 462–63 (Iowa 2010) (accepting violations of the ECOA to be raised as an 
affirmative defense of illegality, which would completely invalidate the debt created from the 
violation); see also Ronald Mann, Justices Dubious Of Protections For Spousal Guarantors, 
LAW360 (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/709196/justices-dubious-of-
protections-for-spousal-guarantors (“[I]f “applicant” is extended to include “guarantor,” then 
the logical consequence would be that the guarantors have the right to invalidate the entire 
loan, not just their guaranties — a considerable windfall for the borrower.”); Hletko & 
Stapleton, supra note 27 (“[A] guarantor seeking to invalidate his or her guaranty based on 
an ECOA violation could render a debt entirely uncollectable.”) (emphasis added); but see RL 
BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 386 (emphasis added) (“A creditor will only lose its entire debt if 
the borrower immediately defaults and the pledged collateral turns out to be worthless.”). 
 42. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2016). 
 43. Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1072 (2016); Hawkins v. Cmty. 
Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937, 939–40 (8th Cir. 2014); Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of 
Raymore, No. 12-CV-00670-DW, 2013 WL 12074971, at *3 (W.D. Mo. May 16, 2013); 
Weinberger, supra note 10 (“The case concerns whether Missouri-based Cmty. Bank of 
Raymore improperly required Valerie Hawkins and Janice Patterson to sign on as guarantors 
for more than $2 million in loans that their husbands took out to fund a failed real estate 
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III. HAWKINS V. COMMUNITY BANK OF RAYMORE44 
The dispute in Hawkins v. Community Bank of Raymore arose 
when co-owners of PHC Development, LLC (“PHC”) took out a loan 
requiring their wives to sign as guarantors.45  Gary Hawkins and Chris 
Patterson owned PHC.46  Between 2005 and 2008, the Community Bank 
of Raymore (“Community Bank”) made four loans to PHC, totaling more 
than $2,000,000.47  With each of these loans, the co-owners and their 
respective wives executed personal guarantees to Community Bank to 
secure the loans.48  In April 2012, PHC defaulted on its loans from 
Community Bank.49  Community Bank accelerated payment on the loans 
and demanded payment from PHC as well as Ms. Hawkins and Ms. 
Patterson (“the wives”) as guarantors.50   
As guarantors, the wives were liable for the defaulted payments; 
however, if they demonstrated that the lenders violated the ECOA by 
requiring a spouse to guarantee a loan, it is likely, or at least possible, the 
loan would be deemed void and would not need to be repaid.51  The 
decision of whether the wives owed $2,000,000 in debt hinged on the 
interpretation of the word “applicant.”52  If the wives were deemed 
 
development in Peculiar, Missouri.  Hawkins and Patterson allege that the bank violated a 
Fed[eral] rule aimed at preventing discrimination against women based on their marital status 
by requiring them to serve as guarantors on the loans.”). 
 44. Hawkins, 136 S. Ct. at 1072; Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 937; Hawkins, 2013 WL 
12074971, at *3; Weinberger, supra note 10 (“The case concerns whether Missouri-based 
Community Bank of Raymore improperly required Valerie Hawkins and Janice Patterson to 
sign on as guarantors for more than $2 million in loans that their husbands took out to fund a 
failed real estate development in Peculiar, Missouri.  Hawkins and Patterson allege that the 
bank violated a Fed[eral] rule aimed at preventing discrimination against women based on 
their marital status by requiring them to serve as guarantors on the loans.”). 
 45. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 939. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.; see Mann, supra note 41 (“[I]f ‘applicant’ is extended to include ‘guarantor,’ then 
the logical consequence would be that the guarantors have the right to invalidate the entire 
loan, not just their guaranties — a considerable windfall for the borrower.”); Hletko & 
Stapleton, supra note 27 (emphasis added) (“[A] guarantor seeking to invalidate his or her 
guaranty based on an ECOA violation could render a debt entirely uncollectable.”); but see 
RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Group, LLC, 754 F.3d 380, 386 (6th 
Cir. 2014) (emphasis added) (“A creditor will only lose its entire debt if the borrower 
immediately defaults and the pledged collateral turns out to be worthless.”). 
 52. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b) (2016), with 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(e) (2017). 
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“applicants,” then the spousal guarantees were in violation of the 
ECOA.53  If the wives were not considered applicants, then the loan 
agreements are enforceable and the wives, as guarantors, were 
responsible for the defaulted loan payments.54 
The wives filed an action against Community Bank in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, seeking 
damages and an order declaring the guarantees void and unenforceable.55  
The wives alleged Community Bank required them to execute the 
guarantees securing PHC’s loans solely because they were married to 
their respective husbands; they claimed this was discrimination on the 
basis of their marital status, in violation of the ECOA.56  On summary 
judgment, the district court concluded the wives were not “applicants” 
under the ECOA and, therefore, Community Bank did not violate the 
ECOA by requiring the wives to execute the guarantees.57  The district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of Community Bank.58 
The wives appealed to the Eighth Circuit.59  They relied on 
Regulation B’s definition of “applicant,” which includes guarantors, to 
argue that they qualified as applicants within the meaning of the ECOA.60  
The Eighth Circuit examined whether it would be appropriate to rely on 
Regulation B’s definition of applicant or if it would instead need to use 
the statutory language of the ECOA, noting that if the wives did not 
qualify as applicants, then Community Bank did not violate the ECOA 
by requiring the wives to execute the guarantees.61  Additionally, if the 
 
 53. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(e). 
 54. 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b). 
 55. Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, No. 12-CV-00670-DW, 2013 WL 12074971, 
at *3 (W.D. Mo. May 16, 2013). 
 56. Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937, 939 (8th Cir. 2014) (“[The wives] 
alleged that Community had required them to execute the guaranties securing PHC’s loans 
solely because they are married to their respective husbands.  They claimed that this 
requirement constituted discrimination against them on the basis of their marital status in 
violation of the ECOA.”); Hawkins, 2013 WL 12074971, at *3. 
 57. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 940 (“The district court concluded that Hawkins and Patterson 
were not ‘applicants’ within the meaning of the ECOA and thus that Community had not 
violated the ECOA by requiring them to execute the guaranties.”); Hawkins, 2013 WL 
12074971, at *3. 
 58. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 940; Hawkins, 2013 WL 12074971, at *3. 
 59. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 940. 
 60. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(e) (2017); see id. at 940–41 (“Hawkins and Patterson argue that 
they qualify as applicants within the meaning of the ECOA because they guaranteed PHC’s 
debt to Community.  They do not argue that they qualify as applicants on any other basis.”). 
 61. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 941 (“This case turns, then, on whether we should apply [12 
C.F.R. § 1002.2(e)’s] definition of applicant, which would permit Hawkins and Patterson to 
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wives were able to rely on Regulation B, then the wives would be able to 
cite the spousal guarantor rule and raise an ECOA violation as an 
affirmative defense.62  If the wives were only able to rely on the language 
within the ECOA, which does not reference spousal guarantors, then the 
wives would only be able to file a counterclaim against Community Bank 
if they believed there was an ECOA violation.63 
The Eighth Circuit applied the Chevron64 test to decide whether 
it should use the statutory definition provided, or if the court needed to 
adopt the agency’s definition from Regulation B.65  The Chevron test 
consists of two prongs.66  The first prong requires the court to consider 
whether the statutory language clearly speaks to the question at issue.67  
If the court is able to determine Congress’ intent, then the statute will 
suffice, and the inquiry will end with no need to look at the second 
prong.68  If the statutory language is considered ambiguous and the 
legislative intent is not easily understood, then the court will move on to 
 
pursue an ECOA claim as applicants solely because they executed guarantees to secure PHC’s 
loans.”). 
 62. See Bolduc v. Beal Bank, SSB, 167 F.3d 667, 672 (1st Cir. 1999) (allowing 
defendants to raise an affirmative defense of recoupment); Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple 
Investor Fund, L.P., 51 F.3d 28, 32–33 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding ECOA violations can be raised 
as an affirmative defense of recoupment); Bank of the West v. Kline, 782 N.W.2d 453, 462–
63 (Iowa 2010) (ruling that violations to the ECOA may be used as an affirmative defense  of 
illegality); see also Revision of the Board’s Equal Credit Regulation:  An Overview, 71 FED. 
RES. BULL. 12, at 919 (“[Including guarantors as applicants] is also consistent with the 
congressional intent for enforcement through private lawsuits because it gives the guarantor 
the right to bring a lawsuit or to file a counterclaim against a creditor.  To recover damages, 
the guarantor must prove that the creditor violated the signature rules and also must establish 
the damages suffered.”). 
 63. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2016); Riggs Nat’l Bank of Wash., D.C. v. Linch, 
829 F. Supp. 163, 169 (E.D. Va. 1993) (denying defendants the opportunity to raise an ECOA 
violation as an affirmative defense, and only allowing claims or counterclaims to be brought). 
 64. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
 65. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 940–41 (“To determine whether we should defer to the Federal 
Reserve’s interpretation of the ECOA’s definition of applicant, we apply the two-step 
framework established by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.”).  
 66. Id.   
 67. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (“First, always, is the question whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”).   
 68. Id. at 842–43 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the 
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.”); North Dakota v. E.P.A., 730 F.3d 750, 763 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Baptist 
Health v. Thompson, 458 F.3d 768, 773 (8th Cir. 2006)) (“[W]e ask first whether the intent 
of Congress is clear as to the precise question at issue.  If, by employing traditional tools of 
statutory construction, we determine that Congress’ intent is clear, that is the end of the 
matter.”). 
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the second prong.69  If the second prong analysis is necessary, the court 
will consider whether the agency’s definition of the ambiguous statutory 
language is a reasonable interpretation in light of the plain language of 
the statute.70  
In Hawkins, the Eighth Circuit looked at the first prong of the test 
and concluded there was no ambiguity in the statutory language.71  This 
meant the court would rely on the definition of “applicant” coming 
directly from Congress in the ECOA and not consider Regulation B’s 
definition.72  The court explained, “the text of the ECOA clearly provides 
that a person does not qualify as an applicant under the statute solely by 
virtue of executing a guarantee to secure the debt of another.”73  The court 
further clarified, “a person is an applicant only if she requests credit,”74 
and that “a person does not, by executing a guarantee, request credit.”75  
This led the Eighth Circuit to its ultimate decision that “a guarantor does 
not request credit and therefore cannot qualify as an applicant under the 
unambiguous text of the ECOA.”76  Therefore, the court concluded that 
Community Bank did not violate the ECOA by requiring spousal 
guarantees.77 
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the wives’ claims on appeal; 
it seemed as if courts and creditors would finally receive an answer on 
 
 69. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (“If, however, the court determines Congress has not 
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own 
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative 
interpretation.”).  
 70. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the 
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.”); E.P.A., 730 F.3d at 763. 
 71. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 941–42 (“Applying the first step of the Chevron framework, 
we conclude that the text of the ECOA clearly provides that a person does not qualify as an 
applicant under the statute solely by virtue of executing a guaranty to secure the debt of 
another.”). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 941. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 942 (“Because the text of the ECOA is unambiguous regarding whether a 
guarantor constitutes an applicant, we will not defer to the Federal Reserve’s interpretation of 
applicant, and we can conclude that a guarantor is not protected from marital-status 
discrimination by the ECOA.”). 
 77. Id. at 943 (“Accordingly, we conclude that Hawkins and Patterson are not applicants 
under the ECOA, and thus Community did not violate the ECOA by requiring them to execute 
the guaranties.”). 
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whether a spousal guarantor is an applicant subject to the ECOA.78  
Unfortunately, what was supposed to provide clarity only left more 
confusion surrounding the issue.79  After the death of Justice Antonin 
Scalia, the remaining eight Justices could not reach a majority, leaving 
the equally divided Supreme Court to affirm the Eighth Circuit through a 
one sentence, per curiam decision.80  As a result, Hawkins is only binding 
on the Eighth Circuit and serves merely as a reference that other federal 
and state courts may look to for guidance.81 
IV. CIRCUIT SPLITS AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ INTERPRETATIONS OF 
“APPLICANT” 
A number of courts have heard cases regarding discrimination on 
the basis of marital status in violation of the ECOA.82  The Seventh 
Circuit, like the Eighth Circuit, found the ECOA’s definition of 
“applicant” to be unambiguous and not to include spousal guarantors.83  
However, the Sixth Circuit relied on Regulation B’s definition of 
“applicant” because the court found the ECOA definition ambiguous, 
 
 78. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937 
(2014) (No. 13-3065). 
 79. Weinberger, supra note 10 (“Justice Sonia Sotomayor said that the common 
understanding of ‘applicant’ backed the government and petitioners’ position.  ‘And they 
don’t suggest it has to be for yourself:  It could be you’re asking for an extension of credit for 
anyone,’ she said.” . . . “Justice Elena Kagan asked Brian H. Fletcher, the assistant to the 
solicitor general arguing the government’s position, whether granting spouses the right to 
challenge the requirement that they sign on to a loan opened up ‘liability on a scale that 
Congress wouldn’t have expected because . . . the guarantor can come in and declare the entire 
loan invalid and the damages would be much higher.’  ‘There’s nothing at all unreasonable 
about requiring a lender that has improperly demanded a guaranty to not be able to enjoy the 
benefit of that guaranty,’ Fletcher said.”). 
 80. Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1072 (2016); The U.S. Supreme 
Court Will Return with Only 8 Justices, FORTUNE (Sept. 30, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/
09/30/us-supreme-court-justices/; Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme 
Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/
antonin-scalia-death.html. 
 81. See Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. 107, 111 (1868) (explaining equally divided 
decisions are not “an authority for other cases of like character”).  
 82. Hawkins, 136 S. Ct. at 1072 (rendering an equally divided Supreme Court per 
curiam); RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Group, LLC, 754 F.3d 380 
(6th Cir. 2014) (ruling guarantors are considered applicants, and therefore spousal guarantors 
may seek protection under the ECOA); Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atlantic Mkt. Dev. Co., 
476 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding wives are not considered applicants and therefore 
spouses cannot use the ECOA as protection when they are guarantors). 
 83. Moran, 476 F.3d at 436. 
   
146 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 22 
holding that requiring a spousal guarantee violated the ECOA.84  
Additionally, other circuits have deferred to Regulation B’s definition of 
“applicant,” without conducting a Chevron analysis to arrive at this 
decision.85 
A. Courts Finding the ECOA’s Definition Unambiguous 
Several courts, such as the Seventh Circuit in Moran Foods v. 
Mid-Atlantic Market Development Co., LLC, have ruled that the ECOA 
definition of “applicant” is unambiguous and relied on the language 
within the ECOA to define the word.86  Mid-Atlantic was a grocery store 
owned by defendant Roger Camp, and a franchisee of Moran Foods.87  
Mid-Atlantic owed Moran Foods money for groceries, but could not pay 
and defaulted on its loans.88  Camp’s wife, Susan, had guaranteed the 
company’s debt, but refused to honor the guarantees.89  Moran Foods 
sued for breach of contract, and Mrs. Camp counterclaimed, alleging that 
Moran had violated the ECOA by requiring her to guarantee loans.90 
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by noting the ECOA’s 
express purpose was to increase the availability of credit for women, and 
to ensure that creditors did not deny women credit solely on the basis of 
 
 84. RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 380. 
 85. Hletko & Stapleton, supra note 27 (“Since the 1985 Amendment to Regulation B, 
courts historically have deferred to the Board’s interpretation and permitted spousal 
guarantors to bring claims under ECOA. The majority of state and federal courts considering 
this issue, including the First, Third and Fourth Circuits, have axiomatically applied the 
expanded definition without reaching the question of agency deference under the two-step 
Chevron framework.”). 
 86. Moran, 476 F.3d at 441 (“But there is nothing ambiguous about ‘applicant’ and no 
way to confuse an applicant with a guarantor.”). 
 87. Id. at 437 (“We shall simplify ruthlessly.  Moran Foods franchises grocery stores 
under the name ‘Save-A-Lot’ and sells the stores many of the groceries they need.  Mid-
Atlantic . . . was one of the franchisees.”). 
 88. Id. (“Mid-Atlantic’s stores faltered, and eventually defaulted, leaving it owing Moran 
a considerable amount of money for groceries bought but not paid for.  Mid-Atlantic later 
declared bankruptcy.”). 
 89. Id. (“Roger Camp, the owner of Mid-Atlantic, and his wife, Susan Camp, had 
guaranteed the company’s debts to Moran.”). 
 90. See id. (“When they refused to honor their guaranties, Moran brought this suit for 
breach of contract against the two Camps plus Mid-Atlantic.  Mid-Atlantic and Susan Camp 
counterclaimed. . . . Susan Camp claimed that Moran had violated the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act, which so far as relates to this case forbids ‘any creditor to discriminate 
against any applicant with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction . . . on the basis of . . . 
marital status.”). 
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their gender.91  The court went on to assert that Mrs. Camp “was not an 
applicant for credit,”92 rather she “guaranteed her husband’s debt.”93  The 
Seventh Circuit looked at the statutory language defining “applicant” to 
determine whether or not it was ambiguous.94  The court concluded “there 
is nothing ambiguous about ‘applicant’ and no way to confuse an 
applicant with a guarantor.”95  
The court acknowledged that Congress likely would not have 
included guarantors as “applicants” because it would open “vistas of 
liability” they never intended.96  The “vistas of liability” refer to the 
potential negative impacts of adopting Regulation B’s definition.97  
Among the negative impacts is the amount of debt that could be forgiven 
if a spousal guarantor were to succeed on an ECOA violation claim.98  A 
violation of the ECOA would allow guarantors to void more than just 
their guarantee, it would also allow the guarantors to invalidate the entire 
loan.99 
In Moran, the court found that the creditor was not forcing a 
spousal guarantee; rather, the creditor was ensuring he could seize the 
assets if a default occurred.100  After the creditor noticed several 
 
 91. See id. at 441 (explaining that a purpose of ECOA was to eliminate the assumption 
of a woman’s role in childcare negatively affecting their credit worthiness). 
 92. Id. (“Susan Camp was not an applicant for credit, and neither received credit nor was 
denied it.”). 
 93. Id. (“Instead she guaranteed her husband’s debt and by doing so enabled his company 
to buy groceries from Moran on credit.”). 
 94. See id. (including the definition of the Board before the CFPB took control of ECOA 
regulation). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. (“What is more, to interpret ‘applicant’ as embracing ‘guarantor’ opens vistas of 
liability that the Congress that enacted the Act would have been unlikely to accept.”). 
 97. See id. (explaining that the Congress that enacted the Act would have been unlikely 
to accept such vistas). 
 98. See id. (“For then, as Susan Camp (not content with the modest damages that she 
obtained in the district court) contends in the cross-appeal, the guaranty would be 
unenforceable and the creditor might lose the entire debt.”). 
 99. Id.; Mann, supra note 41 (“Justices Anthony Kennedy and Elena Kagan were 
concerned about another problem, emphasized by Judge Richard Posner in a lower court 
opinion on the topic:  if ‘applicant’ is extended to include ‘guarantor,’ then the logical 
consequence would be that the guarantors have the right to invalidate the entire loan, not just 
their guaranties—a considerable windfall for the borrower.  As Justice Kagan put it in 
questioning Fletcher, “this actually creates liability on a scale that Congress wouldn’t have 
expected because if you are right, the guarantor can come in and declare the entire loan 
invalid.”). 
 100. See 12 C.F.R. § 1002.7(d)(2) (2017) (“If an applicant requests unsecured credit and 
relies in part upon property that the applicant owns jointly with another person to satisfy the 
creditor’s standards of creditworthiness, the creditor may require the signature of the other 
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residences were listed on the husband’s assets, the creditor asked 
questions to understand if any other individuals had rights to the listed 
assets.101  The creditor did not engage in these questions for the sole 
purpose of finding out if Mr. Camp was married and to force his wife to 
guarantee the loan; rather, it is common practice for a creditor to inquire 
about jointly held assets.102   
In asking these questions, the creditor was ensuring it would have 
access to the asset should the debtor default on payment.103  If the creditor 
did not have the guarantee of Mr. Camp’s wife, the person jointly owning 
the asset, then the creditor would have difficulty collecting the asset if a 
default occurred.104  Therefore, the creditor was not forcing a spousal 
guarantee; rather, the creditor was merely ensuring that in the event of a 
default there would be no other individual claiming rights to the asset and 
not allowing the creditor to seize the asset.105  This would be a common 
measure taken by a creditor regarding any jointly held asset regardless of 
the debtor’s relationship with the co-owner.106  Asking if an asset is 
jointly owned does not necessarily mean it is an inquiry about marriage; 
 
person only on the instrument(s) necessary, or reasonably believed by the creditor to be 
necessary, under the law of the state in which the property is located, to enable the creditor to 
reach the property being relied upon in the event of the death or default of the applicant.”); 
Moran, 476 F.3d at 442 (“It was therefore sound commercial practice unrelated to any 
stereotypical view of a wife’s role for Moran to require that she guarantee the debt along with 
her husband.”). 
 101. See Moran, 476 F.3d at 441–42 (“[W]hen Moran looked at the list of assets submitted 
by Roger Camp, who had agreed to guarantee repayment of any debts that Mid-Atlantic 
incurred to Moran, it noticed that several residences were included and so it naturally and 
correctly assumed that Mrs. Camp had an interest in those assets.”). 
 102. See id. at 442 (“The residences of a married couple are usually owned either jointly 
or by the spouse other than the one who included them in the list of assets that he submitted 
to obtain credit.  Often spouses don’t know the precise allocation of property between them 
because it has been made by their lawyer . . . .”). 
 103. See id. 
 104. See id. (“In fact some $2.5 million of the $8.2 million in assets listed on Mr. Camp’s 
credit application were actually owned by Mrs. Camp.”). 
 105. See 12 C.F.R. § 1002.7(d)(2) (“Unsecured credit. If an applicant requests unsecured 
credit and relies in part upon property that the applicant owns jointly with another person to 
satisfy the creditor’s standards of creditworthiness, the creditor may require the signature of 
the other person only on the instrument(s) necessary, or reasonably believed by the creditor 
to be necessary, under the law of the state in which the property is located, to enable the 
creditor to reach the property being relied upon in the event of the death or default of the 
applicant.”); Moran, 476 F.3d at  442 (“It was therefore sound commercial practice unrelated 
to any stereotypical view of a wife’s role for Moran to require that she guarantee the debt 
along with her husband.”). 
 106. See Moran, 476 F.3d at 441–42 (explaining the normalcy of securing proper collateral 
for a loan). 
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an asset could be held jointly with a family member, friend, or business 
partner.107   
B. Courts finding the ECOA’s Definition Ambiguous and Instead 
Relying on Regulation B 
Prior to Hawkins, and after the 1985 amendment of Regulation B, 
the majority of courts deferred to the Regulation B definition of applicant.  
They have allowed spousal guarantors to file claims under the ECOA.108  
Some courts give such deference to agency definitions, forgoing the 
Chevron analysis and outright relying on the Board’s—and now 
CFPB’s—interpretation.109 
In RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Group, 
LLC, the Sixth Circuit held that “applicant” could be construed to include 
guarantors due to the ambiguous definition within the ECOA, and 
therefore, individuals can raise a violation of the ECOA as an affirmative 
defense.110  Bridgemill was one of two residential properties that Bernard 
Dixon invested millions of dollars into in the wake of the 2008 financial 
crisis, which left him nearly $10 million in debt.111  Mr. Dixon sought to 
refinance his debt, but the bank deemed him not independently 
 
 107. See id. (“As far as appears [to the creditor], had they been unmarried but living 
together, whether as boyfriend and girlfriend, or as siblings, or father and daughter, or just 
roommates, as soon as Moran learned that Roger Camp was living with someone it would 
have realized that one or more of the residences on Camp’s list of assets might be owned with 
someone else or maybe owned entirely by someone else.  And so it would have insisted on 
the guaranty.  If so, there was no discrimination on the basis of marital status.”). 
 108. See Hletko & Stapleton, supra note 27 (“Since the 1985 Amendment to Regulation 
B, courts historically have deferred to the Board’s interpretation and permitted spousal 
guarantors to bring claims under ECOA. The majority of state and federal courts considering 
this issue, including the First, Third and Fourth Circuits, have axiomatically applied the 
expanded definition without reaching the question of agency deference under the two-step 
Chevron framework.”). 
 109. See Hletko & Stapleton, supra note 27; see, e.g., Mayes v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 167 
F.3d 675, 677 (1st Cir. 1999) (looking to Regulation B’s definition of applicant without 
applying Chevron); Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Inv’r Fund, L.P., 51 F.3d 28, 30–31 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (accepting guarantors as applicants as the Regulation B definition described 
without using Chevron’s two-prong approach); Ballard v. Bank of America, 734 F.3d 308, 
310 n.1 (4th Cir. 2013) (deferring to the agency definition of applicant without using 
Chevron); but see Moran, 476 F.3d (rendering the Seventh Circuit as the only federal circuit 
court not to treat Regulation B’s definition of applicant as applicable prior to Hawkins). 
 110. RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Group, LLC, 754 F.3d 380, 
381 (6th Cir. 2014) (“We hold that a violation of ECOA and Regulation B can be asserted as 
an affirmative defense of recoupment.”). 
 111. Id. at 381–82. 
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creditworthy.112  The bank suggested he find additional collateral to be 
able to receive a large enough loan to refinance the properties.113  Mr. 
Dixon pledged a large amount of stock and a corporate debenture, and 
also offered his personal guarantee.114  Furthermore, his wife, agreed to 
pledge the same number of shares, which she owned individually.115  In 
addition to pledging her shares as collateral, Mrs. Dixon too executed a 
personal guarantee.116  Suit was brought against Mr. and Mrs. Dixon for 
defaulting on the loan.117  Mrs. Dixon answered and claimed the 
guarantee was void because it violated the ECOA.118 
The Sixth Circuit held the ECOA’s definition of “applicant” was 
ambiguous and that guarantors could be considered applicants. 119  The 
court reasoned the ECOA’s definition could include individuals that are 
not personally applying for credit.120  The court reached this decision by 
looking to the terms “applies” and “credit” in the statutory definition.121  
While applying Chevron, the court referenced the dictionary to provide 
 
 112. Id. at 382 (“Based on [Mabry Farms development owing $3.2 million to United 
Community Bank and Bridgemill Commons development owing $6.4 million to Regions 
Bank], BB&T concluded that Bernard and BCDG were not independently creditworthy for a 
loan large enough to refinance both the Regions Loan and the UCB Loan.”). 
 113. Id. (“[The loan officer] suggested that BB&T could refinance the Regions Loan, so 
long as Bernard could find additional collateral.”). 
 114. Id. (“To shore up the application, Bernard executed a personal guaranty, meaning that 
he would be personally liable in the case of a default by the borrower.”). 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. (“BB&T produced a summary of the requirements for the loan, which [the loan 
officer] gave to Bernard on May, 2, 2008.  Item one in the summary reads:  ‘[Starr] will be 
required to co-sign the notes with her future release subject to negotiation.’”); id. at 382–83 
(“They also each executed a guaranty which made them individually liable for the amount 
owed on the BCDG Note.”). 
 117. Id. (“On August 12, 2011, Plaintiff filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Tennessee on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.  Plaintiff asserted five causes of 
action, including breach of guaranty against Starr.”). 
 118. Id. (“Starr asserted that her guaranty was unenforceable since it violated the ECOA 
and Regulation B—specifically, Regulation B’s prohibition on requiring souses to guarantee 
loans.”); see 12 C.F.R. § 1002.7(d) (2017). 
 119. See RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d. at 384–85 (rendering a decision by the Sixth Circuit 
that the ECOA definition of “applicant” is ambiguous under a Chevron analysis). 
 120. Id. (interpreting the definition to mean it could “include third parties who do not 
initiate an application for credit, and who do not seek credit for themselves”). 
 121. See id. (“‘[A]pplying the ordinary tools of statutory construction,’ we hold that the 
statutory definition is ambiguous because it could be read to include third parties who do not 
initiate an application for credit, and who do not seek credit for themselves—a category that 
includes guarantors.  We reach this conclusion based on two broad terms in the definition, 
‘applies’ and ‘credit.’”). 
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more clarity.122  The court acknowledged that there were multiple ways 
to interpret “applies.”123  While it is likely “applies” would only refer to 
the individual applying for credit, an acceptable interpretation would also 
encompass guarantors.124 
The Sixth Circuit further stated that the word “credit” as it is used 
in the statutory definition adds even more ambiguity.125  The ambiguity 
exists because the definition explains “an ‘applicant’ requests credit, but 
a ‘debtor’ reaps the benefit.”126  By using two different terms, the ECOA 
allows the possibility that the applicant and the debtor are different 
people.127  Therefore, the court concluded “[i]f an applicant is not 
necessarily the debtor, it would be reasonable to conclude that the 
applicant could be a third party, such as a guarantor.”128    
After determining that the ECOA’s statutory definition of 
“applicant” was ambiguous, the court moved on to the second prong of 
the Chevron test.129  This step questions whether the regulation arises 
from an acceptable interpretation of the statute.130  In answering the 
 
 122. Id. at 385; Applies, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 105 (1993) (“[V]erb:  
to make an appeal or request esp. formally and often in writing and usu. For something of 
benefit to oneself.”); Applies, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2008), http://
www.oed.com/view/Entry/9724 (“[T]o make an approach to (a person) for information or aid; 
to have recourse or make application to, to appeal to; to make a (formal) request for.”).  
 123. RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d. at 385. (regarding the term “applies,” the court found 
that while “one permissible reading of this term is that only the initial applicant can be deemed 
to ‘apply’ for credit,” it is not the only way the statutory definition could be read). 
 124. Id. (reasoning that another interpretation of “applies” could be “all those who offer 
promises in support of an application,” meaning the definition could also include guarantors 
since they “make formal requests for aid in the form of credit for a third party”). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 (2002)) (suggesting there 
is a possibility that “the applicant and the debtor are not always the same person.” 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id. (citations omitted) (“Moving from the text to ECOA’s larger context, we see 
no reason to artificially limit the possible meanings of ‘applicant.’  ECOA prohibits 
discrimination ‘with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction,’ and we have previously 
notes that the statute has ‘broad remedial goals.’  This context confirms what the plan 
language reveals—ECOA’s definition of ‘applicant’ could be construed to cover a guarantor.  
The statute is therefore ambiguous and we move on to Chevron step two.”). 
 130. Id. (assessing the definition through Chevron requires asking “whether the regulation 
stems from a permissible construction of the statute”); see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v Nat. Res. 
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (“[If] the court determines Congress has not 
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own 
construction on the statute, we would be necessary in the absence of an administrative 
interpretation.  Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, 
the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”).  
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question, the court did not need to find that the Regulation B definition 
was the only possible definition to have upheld the purpose of the 
statute.131  Rather, the court can defer to Regulation B’s definition if it 
finds it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute.132  Since “at least one 
of the natural meanings” of applicant includes guarantors, the court held 
that the Regulation B definition including guarantors as applicants was 
permissible.133 
C. Legal Claims Available for Guarantors Based on the Definition 
of “Applicant” Adopted 
Further adding to the circuit split regarding whether guarantors 
are applicants, both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have chosen to 
follow the ECOA language rather than the definition including guarantors 
in Regulation B.134  However, in circuits that have deferred to the CFPB’s 
interpretation, Regulation B language controls.135  Beyond whether or not 
a guarantor is an applicant, this differing language controls whether a 
guarantor can file a claim or is limited only to an affirmative defense.136  
Filing a claim means guarantors could file suit at any point they felt their 
rights had been violated.137  Availability of only an affirmative defense 
 
 131. RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 385 (citing Alliance for Cmty. Media v. F.C.C., 529 
F.3d 763, 778 (6th Cir. 2008)) (“[W]e need not conclude that the agency construction was the 
only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even that the reading 
[the court] would have reached if the question initially has arisen in a judicial proceeding.”). 
 132. See id. (using an agency definition requires the court to determine that “the agency’s 
interpretation [ ] represents a permissible one entitled to deference.”). 
 133. Id. (citing Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 467 (6th Cir. 2006)). 
 134. See Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atlantic Mkt. Dev. Co., 476 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2007); 
Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937, 937 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 135. See Hletko & Stapleton, supra note 27 (explaining the First, Third and Fourth Circuits 
have historically deferred to Regulation B’s definition of applicant and allowed spousal 
guarantors to bring claims under the ECOA). 
 136. See Riggs Nat’l Bank of Wash., D.C. v. Linch, 829 F. Supp. 163, 169 (E.D. Va. 1993) 
(explaining violations of the ECOA cannot be raised as an affirmative defense, they may only 
be raised as a claim or counterclaim); but see RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 384 (recognizing 
that ECOA claims can be raised as an affirmative defense of recoupment; Bank of the W. v. 
Kline, 782 N.W.2d 453, 462–63 (Iowa 2010) (holding defendants may assert violations of the 
ECOA as the affirmative defense of illegality). 
 137. Abraham, supra note 3, at 487 (explaining that the downside of only having an 
affirmative defense available would mean that defendants must wait until a legal action was 
brought against them to defend themselves). 
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means that guarantors must wait until a lawsuit has been filed against 
them to assert a defense.138 
Under the statute, “applicants” have the ability to sue or 
counterclaim for ECOA violations.139  If the ECOA does not consider 
guarantors to be applicants, then the ECOA does not provide a basis for 
guarantors to sue.140  With this, several courts have decided that ECOA 
violations are not affirmative defenses, and can only be raised in the form 
of a claim or a counterclaim.141   
Regulation B, however, gives guarantors the opportunity to sue 
for violations of the spousal guarantor rule.142  Some courts have applied 
Regulation B’s definition and allowed ECOA violations to be used as an 
affirmative defense of illegality, which will completely invalidate the 
guarantee.143  Yet still, other courts use the Regulation B definition to 
serve as a defense of recoupment.144  Recoupment “allows a defendant to 
defend against a claim by asserting—up to the amount of the claim—the 
 
 138. See Abraham, supra note 3, at 487 (“[I]f the FRB’s definition of ‘applicant’ was not 
read into the ECOA, it would require spousal guarantors to wait until the commencement of 
legal action against them to assert an affirmative defense as to the legality of the guaranty. By 
requiring the guarantor to wait, the guarantor might ‘experience financial difficulty to obtain 
individual credit because of these large contingent liabilities, and suffer mental and emotional 
distress resulting from the inability to obtain credit.’”). 
 139. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(c) (2016) (“Action for equitable and declaratory relief.  Upon 
application by an aggrieved applicant, the appropriate United States district court or any other 
court of competent jurisdiction may grant such equitable and declaratory relief as is necessary 
to enforce the requirements imposed under this title.”). 
 140. See id. (giving these rights only to “applicants” as defined in the ECOA). 
 141. See Riggs Nat’l Bank, 829 F. Supp. at 169 (“[T]he ECOA cannot be asserted as an 
affirmative defense.”). 
 142. RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Group, LLC, 754 F.3d 380, 
384 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Regulation B, however, contains its own definition of ‘applicant,’ [in 
section 1002.2(e)] and that definition allows guarantors to sue for violations of the spouse-
guarantor rule.”); see 12 C.F.R. § 1002.16(b)(2) (2017) (“As provided in section 706(f) of the 
Act, a civil action under the Act or this part may be brought in the appropriate United States 
district court without regard to the amount in controversy or in any other court of competent 
jurisdiction within five years after the date of the occurrence of the violation, or within one 
year after the commencement of an administrative enforcement proceeding or of a civil action 
brought by the Attorney General of the United States within five years after the alleged 
violation.”). 
 143. See, e.g., Bank of the W. v. Kline, 782 N.W.2d 453, 462–63 (Iowa 2010) (“The basis 
for allowing [the defendants] to assert the bank’s ECOA violation as affirmative defenses is 
that their unlimited personal guaranties arose out of an illegal act and enforcement would be 
contrary to public policy.”). 
 144. See Bolduc v. Beal Bank, SSB, 167 F.3d 667, 672 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[T]he common 
law doctrine of recoupment, which allows a defendant to ‘defend’ against a claim by 
asserting—up to the amount of the claim—the defendant’s own claim against the plaintiff 
growing out of the same transaction.  Recoupment is allowed even where the defendant’s 
claim would be barred, if asserted in a separate action, by the statute of limitations.”). 
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defendant’s own claim against the plaintiff growing out of the same 
transaction.”145   
Creditors are aware of these repercussions and have become 
fearful of potential consequences associated with lending to married 
couples.  For example, if a creditor violates the ECOA, then the husband 
and wife may not have to pay back the debt at all since it would be 
considered void.  Another risk is that the credit-lending institution could 
be sued and be forced to return the money gained from the asset.146  
V. WHAT TWO DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS MEAN FOR ECOA 
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS  
Creditors, debtors, courts, and regulators were all looking to the 
Supreme Court opinion in Hawkins for a definitive rule.147  
Unfortunately, no such rule was established.148  As long as the circuit split 
remains,149 it is permissible for lower courts outside of the Sixth, Seventh, 
and Eighth Circuits to continue forming their own opinions.150   
The ECOA is subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of both state 
and federal courts, meaning it is permissible for state and federal courts 
to decide differently on the issue.151  In states like Missouri, for example, 
the fate of the verdict is ultimately dependent upon what court system the 
 
 145. RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 387 (quoting Bolduc, 167 F.3d at 672). 
 146. See Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atlantic Mkt. Dev. Co., 476 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(“Where the guaranty is rendered legally unenforceable, the creditor may be forced to lose the 
entire debt.”); RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 386  (emphasis added) (“Furthermore, we are 
not troubled by the prospect of guarantors being made whole after a creditor violates the law.  
A creditor will only lose its entire debt if the borrower immediately defaults and the pledged 
collateral turns out to be worthless.  We will not strike down a valid regulation to salvage bad 
underwriting.”). 
 147. See Edge, supra note 11 (“Until this issue is resolved by the Supreme Court, if ever, 
banks in the 8th Circuit will wonder whether they should listen to the judiciary or Federal 
Reserve Examiners who frequent their banks.”). 
 148. Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1072 (2016). 
 149. See Hawkins, 136 S. Ct. at 1072 (rendering an equally divided Supreme Court per 
curiam). 
 150. See, e.g., RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 380 (ruling guarantors are considered 
applicants, and therefore spousal guarantors may seek protection under the ECOA); Moran, 
476 F.3d at 436 (holding wives are not considered applicants and therefore spouses cannot 
use the ECOA as protection when they are guarantors). 
 151. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(c) (2016) (“Upon application by an aggrieved applicant, the 
appropriate United States district court or any other court of competent jurisdiction may grant 
such equitable and declaratory relief as is necessary to enforce the requirements imposed 
under this sub chapter.”). 
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action is filed in.152  Since there is no binding authority for all to adhere 
to, creditors in different jurisdictions must abide by different rules, and 
some have to guess which law to follow.153  The lack of guidance poses 
a challenge for regional areas, as neighboring states and circuits have 
different determinations and the confusion has also become a major 
obstacle for different courts within the same state.154   
If lenders remain unsure of what they can and cannot do, and 
continue to face negative repercussions in some jurisdictions, it may 
result in more difficulty for a married person to receive a loan.155  A 
creditor is unlikely to continue loaning large credit lines to married 
borrowers knowing that if the loan was guaranteed by a spouse, there is 
a chance the creditor will not receive payment from the guaranteed 
assets.156  This would require those seeking credit to find another 
guarantor.157  Some individuals may have a business partner or other 
 
 152. See Arvest Bank v. Uppalapti, 2013 WL 85336, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Jan 7, 2013) 
(adopting the view expressed in Moran that a guarantor is not an applicant); Champion Bank 
v. Reg’l Dev., LLC, 2009 WL 1351122 at *3 (E.D. Mo. May 13, 2009) (following Moran’s 
decision that guarantors are not applicants); Frontenac Bank v. T.R. Hughes, Inc. 404 S.W.3d 
272, 291 (Mo. Appl. E.D. 2012) (denying Moran’s reasoning and instead deciding that 
guarantors are applicants); Boone Nat’l Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Crouch, 47 S.W.3d 371, 376 
(Mo. Banc. 2001) (finding that guarantors are applicants). 
 153. See Edge, supra note 11 (“For banks that do business across state lines, this could be 
an interesting issue.”); see Hletko & Stapleton, supra note 27, at n.50 (“[C]reditors outside of 
the Eighth and Seventh Circuits should assume that the Sixth Circuit rule applies to avoid 
potential liability for impermissibly requiring spousal guarantees.”); but see Chris Bruce, 
Deadlocked Justices Back Bank on ECOA, Guarantors, BNA (Mar. 22, 2016), https://
buckleysandler.com/news/2016-03-25/valerie-hletko-quoted-bloomberg-bna-article-
deadlocked-justices-back-bank-ecoa-guarantors (“[B]anks have a reasonable degree of 
assurance that they may obtain guaranties from spouses of married business owners.”). 
 154. See Edge, supra note 11 (“Our neighbors in Arkansas will have one definition of 
‘applicant’ for ECOA purposes, and Tennessee, another.”). 
 155. See Edge, supra note 11 (“Until this issue is resolved by the Supreme Court, if ever, 
banks in the 8th Circuit will wonder whether they should listen to the judiciary or Federal 
Reserve Examiners who frequent their banks.”). 
 156. See Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atlantic Mkt.Dev. Co., 476 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(“Where the guaranty is rendered legally unenforceable, the creditor may be forced to lost the 
entire debt.”); RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Group, LLC, 754 F.3d 
380, 386 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Furthermore, we are not troubled by the prospect to guarantors 
being made whole after a creditor violates the law.  A creditor will only lose its entire debt if 
the borrower immediately defaults and the pledged collateral turns out to be worthless.  We 
will not strike down a valid regulation to salvage bad underwriting.”). 
 157. See SMALL BUS. ADMIN., SMALL BUS. RES.:  FOR NORTHERN CAL. 2 (Mar. 20, 2017), 
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/resource_files/SBA_one_pager_for_digit 
al_distribution_-_03-2017.pdf (“Each person who owns 20% or more of the business must 
provide a personal guaranty of the loan, and must have satisfactory personal credit.  When 
evaluating applications for approval, lenders often consider the applicant’s character and 
credit, management capability, collateral, and the owner’s equity contribution.”).  
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individual willing to sign for them, however, many individuals rely on 
spouses to guarantee their debts.158  Not allowing creditors to accept 
spousal guarantees could limit the amount of credit a person could 
receive.159  This would effectively mean that the ECOA, which was 
enacted to disallow credit-lending discrimination on the basis of marital 
status, constricts opportunities for credit based on one’s marital status.160  
A. Positive and Negative Impacts of Spousal Guarantors 
Creditors requiring spousal guarantors conflicts with Congress’ 
express intent in passing the ECOA.161  Requiring a spouse to guarantee 
a debt is essentially forcing a wife to become liable for everything the 
husband would be liable for should he default.162  This is a much larger 
undertaking than requiring a wife to grant a lien on her interest in jointly 
held property.163  The scope would be broadened to include everything 
 
 158. See Bill Fay, Loan Agreements with Family and Friends, DEBT.ORG, https://
www.debt.org/credit/loans/friends-family/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (“According to the 
Federal Reserve Board Survey of Consumer Finances, loans from family and friends amount 
to $89 billion each year in the United States.  The most popular reasons for asking family 
members or friends for a loan are to start a business or purchase a home.  A national survey 
by Fundable said 38% of startup businesses relied on money from family or friends.”). 
 159. See Justin Pritchard, Personal Guarantee Basics, THE BALANCE, https://
www.thebalance.com/personal-guarantee-basics-315207 (last updated Feb. 14, 2017) 
(“Lenders always evaluate borrowers to predict whether or not they’ll repay.  For consumer 
loans, there are credit scores and numerous other sources of information to help with the 
decision.  However, businesses—especially new businesses and operations that have never 
borrowed—probably don’t have a business-specific credit history.  With limited information 
it’s hard for lenders to make a decision.  They would be more comfortable if they could see 
that you’ve borrowed money in the past and consistently repaid loans.  When they can’t make 
a decision based on historical information, they require some sort of security (or they charge 
an extremely high interest rate).  That security often comes in the form of a personal guarantee, 
although other approaches such as pledging business assets as collateral, can be used.”). 
 160. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. 93-495, § 502, 88 Stat. 1521, 1521 (1974) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2016)) (“The Congress finds that there is a need to insure that 
the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extensions of credit exercise 
their responsibility to make credit available with fairness, impartiality, and without 
discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status.”). 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Sam Thacker, Personal Guarantees Required in Small Business Loans, ALL BUS., 
https://www.allbusiness.com/personal-guarantees-required-in-small-business-loans-
10753236-1.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (“An individual being asked to sign an unlimited 
personal guarantee is being asked to sign a guarantee that a lender will recover from the 
guarantor 100% of any outstanding loans made and any and all legal fees associated with the 
loan.”). 
 163. Id. 
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the wife owns independently as well.164  Requiring a spousal guarantee, 
rather than allowing a spouse to choose to guarantee, means a spouse is 
bound to a debt solely due to their spouse’s independent decision to take 
out a loan.165  This results in forcing individuals to be guarantors due to 
their marital status.166  The other alternative is for individuals to decide 
against borrowing when faced with the reality that both spouses will have 
to guarantee the debt, which would in-turn negatively impact the 
availability of credit.167   
While it should not be permissible for a creditor to force a spouse 
to guarantee a loan, it may be necessary for a creditor to inquire about a 
debtor’s marital status.168  In many states spouses may jointly hold assets, 
such as holding property through tenancy by the entirety.169  Some 
 
 164. See Id.; JUSTIN M. LEWIS, WARD AND SMITH, P.A, CLIENT ALERT:  HOW SHOULD TWO 
OR MORE PEOPLE OWN PROPERTY?  DOES IT MATTER (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.war 
dandsmith.com/articles/how-should-two-or-more-people-own-property-does-it-matter (“[A] 
lien or judgment docketed against one spouse will not attach to property owned as tenants by 
the entirety because the property is not owned by the husband or the wife, but by the marital 
entity.”). 
 165. NORMAN J. LEONARD, WARD AND SMITH, P.A, CLIENT ALERT:  SPOUSAL 
GUARANTIES—CLARIFYING THE RULES OF GOVERNING PERSONAL GUARANTIES FROM SPOUSES 
(Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.wardandsmith.com/articles/personal-guaranties-from-spouses-
of-borrowers (“[C]ourts have frequently held that it is illegal for a lender to require a spousal 
guaranty if the sole reason the lender is requiring it is that the spouse happens to be married 
to the person seeking the loan.”).  
 166. Id. 
 167. See Fay, supra note 158 (explaining most individuals require a guarantee from 
someone else to be eligible for credit). 
 168. See 12 C.F.R. § 1002.7(d)(2) (2017) (“Unsecured credit.  If an applicant requests 
unsecured credit and relies in part upon property that the applicant owns jointly with another 
person to satisfy the creditor’s standards of creditworthiness, the creditor may require the 
signature of the other person only on the instrument(s) necessary, or reasonably believed by 
the creditor to be necessary, under the law of the state in which the property is located, to 
enable the creditor to reach the property being relied upon in the event of the death or default 
of the applicant.”); 12 C.F.R § 1002.7(d)(3) (“If a married applicant requests unsecured credit 
and resides in a community property state, or if the applicant is relying on property located in 
such a state, a creditor may require the signature of the spouse on any instrument necessary, 
or reasonably believed by the creditor to be necessary, under applicable state law to make the 
community property available to satisfy the debt . . . .”). 
 169. See Julie Garber, Property Titles and Tenants by the Entirety, THE BALANCE, https://
www.thebalance.com/tenants-by-the-entirety-3505608 (May 12, 2017) (“[In a tenancy by the 
entirety each] spouse individually own[s] the entire property as a tenant by the entirety.  
Husband and wife are treated as a single legal entity.”); Joint Property and Concurrent 
Ownership, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/joint-property-concurrent-
ownership-32229.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (“In some states that do recognize tenancies 
by the entirety, a creditor is allowed to collect a spouse’s debts from the interests of the 
property as a whole (as long as the debtor spouse is still alive).  Other states have banned this 
practice and only allow a collector to foreclose on a tenancy if both spouses are liable for the 
underlying debt.”). 
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married persons do not have enough individually-owned assets to serve 
as adequate collateral to banks.  If they are unable to list jointly-owned 
assets, then it may not be possible for them to receive credit.170  
While there are benefits to allowing spousal guarantors, there are 
also downsides.  One downside is couples attempting to beat the system 
by later claiming a spousal guarantee was an ECOA violation.171  For 
example, many married couples have joint assets, and not having a spouse 
guarantee the assets as collateral may mean the creditor could not seize 
the assets.172  If a creditor sues a debtor to collect on the debt and some 
of the debtor’s assets are owned jointly with the spouse, they may be free 
of the creditor’s claim.173  Thus, the creditor needs the debtor and their 
spouse to be guarantors so that the jointly owned assets are available to 
 
 170. See Fay, supra note 158 (“According to the Federal Reserve Board Survey of 
Consumer Finances, loans from family and friends amount to $89 billion each year in the 
United States.  The most popular reasons for asking family members or friends for a loan are 
to start a business or purchase a home.  A national survey by Fundable said 38% of startup 
businesses relied on money from family or friends.”). 
 171. See Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atlantic Mkt. Dev. Co., 476 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(“Where the guaranty is rendered legally unenforceable, the creditor may be forced to lose the 
entire debt.”); Alexander Hurst, Reg. B Is No Guaranty:  Missouri Courts’ Openly Divergent 
Views on the Enforceability of Coerced Spousal Guaranties in Commercial Lending, 79 MO. 
L. REV. 467, 468 (2014) (“[R]elying on Reg. B’s ostensible protection, married individuals 
can attempt to avoid liability for their spouse’s default after having been forced to personally 
guarantee the obligation.”). 
 172. See 1 JOYCE PALOMAR & ROBERT WILCOX, PATTON & PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES §  
224 (3d ed. 2002) (“[A]ny conveyance or encumbrance of tenancy by the entirety property 
must be signed by both spouses in order to be effective.  Also, a creditor of one spouse may 
not be able to reach property or proceeds from property held in tenancy by the entirety.”); 
Tenancy By The Entirety States and Community Property States, ASSET PROTECTION 
PLANNERS, https://www.assetprotectionplanners.com/planning/tenancy-by-the-entirety-
states-and-community-property-states/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (“Tenancy by the Entirety 
ownership lets spouses own property together as a legal unit.  It does not permit the creditors 
of an individual spouse to seize and sell the interest of the debtor spouse. Therefore, it can be 
thought of as a small part of an overall asset protection plan.  Only creditors who have 
judgments against both the husband and the wife may attach and sell property held in this 
manner.”). 
 173. See 12 C.F.R. § 1002.7(d)(2) (“If an applicant requests unsecured credit and relies in 
part upon property that the applicant owns jointly with another person to satisfy the creditor’s 
standards of creditworthiness, the creditor may require the signature of the other person only 
on the instrument(s) necessary, or reasonably believed by the creditor to be necessary, under 
the law of the state in which the property is located, to enable the creditor to reach the property 
being relied upon in the event of the death or default of the applicant.”); 12 C.F.R. §  
1002.7(d)(4) (“If an applicant requests secured credit, a creditor may require the signature of 
the applicant’s spouse or other person on any instrument necessary, or reasonably believed by 
the creditor to be necessary, under applicable state law to make the property being offered as 
security available to satisfy the debt in the event of default, for example, an instrument to 
create a valid lien, pass clear title, waive inchoate rights, or assign earnings.”). 
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satisfy the judgment for an unpaid debt.174  Using Regulation B’s 
language as a shield is a tactic married couples have used to ensure they 
could escape some or all liability should a default occur.175  If a court 
were to decide that requiring the spouse to guarantee the loan was in fact 
a violation of the ECOA on the creditor’s behalf, it could mean that some 
or all of the loan would not have to be paid back in the event of a 
default.176 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTION BY CONGRESS AND THE 
CFPB  
Due to judicial stalemate, Congress must legislate to answer 
whether or not spousal guarantors are afforded the same rights and 
remedies as applicants under the ECOA.  If Congress members do 
legislate on the issue, they should be very intentional and explicit in their 
language to eliminate similar confusion arising in the future.  Similar to 
how the ECOA goes into detail about who is considered an applicant, 
Congress should elaborate further to explain who exactly is a guarantor, 
as well as explain who is not.177  The revised statute should consider 
spousal guarantors as applicants.178  Similar to Regulation B, the ECOA 
definition should include a section about spouses.179  This section should 
 
 174. See PALOMAR & WILCOX, supra note 172 (“[A] creditor of one spouse may not be 
able to reach property or proceeds from property held in tenancy by the entirety.”).  
 175. See Hurst, supra note 171, at 468 n.3 (citing Andrew B. Lustigman & Alicia M. 
Serfaty, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act as a Defense Against Payment:  How Lenders Can 
Strike Back, 111 BANK. L. J. 444, 445 (1994)) (“[Debtors will] seek, through any separation 
of an ECOA claim, to declare the underlying note or guaranty obligation void and 
unenforceable.”). 
 176. Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atlantic Mkt. Dev. Co., 476 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(“Where the guaranty is rendered legally unenforceable, the creditor may be forced to lose the 
entire debt.”). 
 177. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b) (2016) (defining applicant as “any person who applies to a 
creditor directly for an extension, renewal, or continuation of credit, or applies to a creditor 
indirectly by use of an existing credit plan for an amount exceeding a previously established 
credit limit”); contra 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2 (e) (2017) (defining applicant as any person who 
requests or who has received an extension of credit from a creditor, and includes any person 
who is or may become contractually liable regarding an extension of credit.  For purposes of §  
1002.7(d), the term includes guarantors, sureties, endorsers, and similar parties.). 
 178. See Bruce, supra note 153 (“In May, the U.S. Solicitor General filed a brief urging 
the Supreme Court to reverse the Eighth Circuit, saying the CFPB deserves deference on the 
question.”). 
 179. See Bruce, supra note 153 (suggesting others are worried about spousal guarantors 
not being considered applicants); RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. 
Group, LLC, 754 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[A] portion of Regulation B . . . refer[red] 
   
160 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 22 
include language explaining that spouses are permissible guarantors so 
long as it is an option and not a requirement.180  The statute should 
explicitly state that a bank cannot force a spouse to sign as a guarantor, 
or refuse a loan solely because a spouse will not guarantee it, meaning a 
creditor cannot present a spouse with an ultimatum of sign this or your 
spouse will not receive credit.181  Spousal guarantors should be 
considered applicants under the statute so that in the event a creditor 
violates the ECOA and requires a spousal guarantee, the guarantor spouse 
can raise an affirmative defense under the ECOA.182   
While modifying the definition within the ECOA would be the 
best option to eliminate confusion, it does not seem likely Congress will 
amend the language. 183  This issue has been questioned in numerous 
courts, and there have been several amendments to the ECOA since the 
Board included guarantors in the definition of applicant, with no further 
indication if guarantors are considered applicants under the language of 
the ECOA.184   
 
to as the ‘spousal-guarantor rule,’ which prohibits a creditor from requiring an applicant’s 
spouse to guarantee a credit instrument, even if the creditor requires someone to execute a 
guaranty.”). 
 180. See RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 383 (“[A] portion of Regulation B . . . refer[red] 
to as the ‘spousal-guarantor rule,’ which prohibits a creditor from requiring an applicant’s 
spouse to guarantee a credit instrument, even if the creditor requires someone to execute a 
guaranty.”); 12 C.F.R. § 1002.7(d)(5) (2017) (“The applicant’s spouse may serve as an 
additional party [supporting the application], but the creditor shall not require that the spouse 
be the additional party.”). 
 181. See RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 383 (“[A] portion of Regulation B . . . refer[red] 
to as the ‘spousal-guarantor rule,’ which prohibits a creditor from requiring an applicant’s 
spouse to guarantee a credit instrument, even if the creditor requires someone to execute a 
guaranty.”). 
 182. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(c) (2016) (“Action for equitable and declaratory relief.  Upon 
application by an aggrieved applicant, the appropriate United States district court or any other 
court of competent jurisdiction may grant such equitable and declaratory relief as is necessary 
to enforce the requirements imposed under this title.”); 71 FED. RES. BULL., REVISION OF THE 
BOARD’S EQUAL CREDIT REGULATION:  AN OVERVIEW 919 (1985) (“[E]nforcement through 
private lawsuits. . . gives the guarantor the right to bring a lawsuit or to file a counterclaim 
against a creditor.”).  
 183. See RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 385 (“Congress has also been unmoved by [a 
creditor losing an entire debt if spousal-guarantors are considered applicants].  ECOA has 
undergone several amendments since the Federal Reserve included guarantors within the 
definition of ‘applicant’—including an extensive amendment to the statute after Moran was 
decided—and none has clarified that the term ‘applicant’ cannot include guarantors.”). 
 184. Id.; see Aimee L. Ezzell, The CFPB Finalizes Amendments to ECOA Regulations and 
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Alternatively, the CFPB can amend Regulation B if Congress 
refuses to act.  Although it does not seem that an amendment to 
Regulation B would solve the overarching issue, it is possible that a nine-
member Supreme Court could hear another case regarding spousal 
guarantors and decide the ECOA language pertaining to applicants is 
ambiguous.185  If the Court found the language was ambiguous, they 
would defer to the definitions contained in Regulation B.186  If the CFPB 
amended Regulation B’s language, it would be wise to add in “spousal 
guarantors” to the list of persons that qualify as applicants in 12 C.F.R. § 
1002.2(e).187  Additionally, the CFPB should further elaborate what 
exactly it means to require a spouse to guarantee a loan and describe more 
specifically what a creditor is forbidden from doing in 12 C.F.R. § 
1002.7(d)(5).188  The clarification should add that creditors cannot 
present ultimatums and state that should a spouse of an otherwise 
creditworthy individual not guarantee a loan, then there will be no line of 
credit extended.189  An amended Regulation B could resolve issues like 
these as well as provide guidance to creditors and borrowers in the 
future.190 
VII. CONCLUSION 
While there is much confusion and discussion surrounding 
ECOA violations due to marital status, using the Chevron test, it appears 
both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have come down correctly based on 
 
?utm_term=.510c93cab79c (describing the most recent amendments to the ECOA which does 
not include an addition of guarantors to the definition of applicant).  
 185. See RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 384–85 (“‘[A]pplying the ordinary tools of 
statutory construction,’ we hold that the [ECOA] definition [of applicant] is ambiguous.”). 
 186. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (“[I]f the 
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is 
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”). 
 187. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(e) (2017) (“Applicant means any person who requests or who has 
received an extension of credit from a creditor, and includes any person who is or may become 
contractually liable regarding an extension of credit. For purposes of § 1002.7(d), the term 
includes guarantors, sureties, endorsers, and similar parties.”). 
 188. § 1002.7(d)(5) (“The applicant’s spouse may serve as an additional party, but the 
creditor shall not require that the spouse be the additional party.”). 
 189. Id.; RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 383 (suggesting that forcing a spouse to guarantee 
a loan by using an ultimatum would not be permissible because the spousal-guarantor rule 
“prohibits a creditor from requiring an applicant’s spouse to guarantee a credit instrument”). 
 190. See 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(e) (adding guarantors into the definition of applicant has 
already taken a step to clearing up that spousal-guarantors should have rights under the 
ECOA).  
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statutory interpretation.191  Based on the plain language, a guarantor is 
not an applicant under the strict statutory definition of applicant in the 
ECOA.192  While there is a valid argument as to why we would want to 
include spousal guarantors as applicants to afford them protection under 
the ECOA, under the current statutory language, there is no ambiguity, 
and therefore no room for spousal protection under the ECOA as it 
reads.193   
Just because a court has to interpret statutes as written does not 
mean they are the correct decision; it only means that they are the 
judicially appropriate interpretation.194  The best-case scenario to 
eliminate this confusion would be for Congress to speak on the matter 
and give closure to the issue of whether or not a guarantor, or specifically 
a spousal guarantor, will be considered an applicant.195  While that would 
be ideal, it does not seem likely that Congress will step in to eliminate the 
confusion if it has not already.196 Although perhaps seeing that the U.S. 
Solicitor General filed a brief urging a reversal of Hawkins and the fact 
that the issue remains unsolved by the Supreme Court will provide the 
motivation necessary to resolve this issue.197 
 
 191. Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1072 (2016); see Hawkins v. 
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If Congress does not amend the statutory definition and speak to 
the issue of marital status violations of the ECOA, all we can do is wait.  
Creditors, debtors, and courts alike will all have to wait until this issue is 
again heard by the Supreme Court to provide binding authority as the 
supreme law of the land, and provide one unifying decision for all lower 
courts to abide by.198   
It would be best for Congress to amend the ECOA to ensure it is 
aligned with what they intended as well as to fulfill the necessary current 
goals of the Act.  Absent Congressional action, those engaged in credit 
transactions outside the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits will be 
uncertain as to the application of the ECOA to spousal guarantees unless 
and until the Supreme Court takes another look at this issue on which the 
circuit courts are split. 
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